Arguments on the Existence of God

The definition of God is both contentious and varied. For the parameters of my discussion, I will define God as such: A first cause, an unmoved mover, an omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent, personal being that intelligently designed and created the universe.

The purpose of this essay is not to prove or disprove God’s existence. I will provide an overview of various arguments that support and refute certain properties of God, most often individually, rather than attempting to prove the existence of God totally. I will also provide common objections as well my opinions on the arguments.

There are two versions of Cosmological Argument that I will share: The Kalam Argument and the Leibnizian Argument. 

The Kalam Cosmological Argument argues for the existence of a first cause. It asserts that everything that begins to exist has a cause; the universe began to exist; therefore, the universe has a cause. 

 The Leibnizian Argument begins with the principle of sufficient reason: any contingent fact must have an explanation. A contingent fact is one that is true or existent but does not have to be or could be otherwise. For instance, it is a contingent fact that a piece of paper is white; but it could have been black, and therefore there must be a reason for this contingent fact. On the other hand, facts like 1 + 1 = 2 are not contingent because it could not be any other way. The argument provides this line of reasoning: any contingent fact must have an explanation; the existence of the universe is a contingent fact; the existence of the universe must have an explanation; this explanation cannot be explained by something contingent, and therefore must be explained by something necessary. This necessary explanation is referred to as God.

An objection to the Kalam Cosmological Argument rests on the idea of “before” the beginning of time. This objection argues that if the universe began along with time, it seems contradictory to ask what comes before the existence of time. Just as there is no north of the North pole, it may be that it is logically incoherent to ask what came before the Big Bang. 

Objections to the Leibnizian Argument often rest on the principle of sufficient reason. Foremost, challengers point out science may challenge the certainty of this principle: some interpretations of quantum mechanics indicate that certain events are indeterministic and more probabilistic than caused. Another objection rests on the idea of a brute fact. This objection suggests that the principle of sufficient reason may simply be false; perhaps some facts, like the existence of the universe, are brute facts that need no further explanation.

I find the cosmological arguments to be the most persuasive in supporting the existence of God. An explanation for the existence, cause, and origin of the universe is lacking in the contemporary sciences. Furthermore, the question of why a universe exists at all is strong as well. A natural, physical universe that simply began to exist seems, to me, difficult to believe.

The Ontological Argument argues for God’s existence based on the concept and definition of God itself. In philosopher Anselm’s words, God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived. A being that exists is greater than a being that only exists in understanding. One can imagine a God that exists only in understanding, and a God that exists in reality. Since God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived, God exists in reality.

An objection to the Ontological Argument rests on the nature of existence. Philosophers like Kant argue that existence is not a real predicate that adds to the definition of God; unlike aspects like wisdom or power, existence does not make a thing greater or add to its properties. Another objection exists on the idea that you cannot define things into existence. Such is the thought experiment parodying the logic of the Ontological Argument by Gaunilo: If there is an island that than which nothing greater can be conceived, and this island can exist in reality or understanding, than this island must exist in reality.

I find the ontological argument fascinating not for its strength, but for its counter intuitiveness. I believe this argument provides insight into the definition and nature of God, as well as subconscious biases against God’s existence.

The Fine-Tuning Argument attempts to support an intelligently created universe. The argument asserts that gravity, the strong nuclear force, electromagnetism, etc., seem extremely tuned to allow for life; even a small variation within these values would have caused life to be nonexistent. Therefore, supporters argue that the universe seems intentionally designed for life rather than caused by random probability.

An objection to this argument is the Anthropic Principle. This principle reasons that humans are able to observe the physical constants of the universe simply because they exist in a universe compatible with life in the first place. Knowledge of whether these values can exist in different states is also debatable.

I find the Fine-Tuning Argument is inconclusive. The Anthropic Principle answers why we are able to observe these values, but do not explain why these values are exactly as they are. Alternative theories like the multiverse theory lack evidence. In the end, knowledge about the cause, origin, and variance of these values seems lacking to me to prove conclusively whether the universe was intelligently designed.

The first argument against God’s existence I will share is the evidential problem of suffering or evil. It is argued that if God is an omnipotent, omnibenevolent, and personal being, then suffering would not exist. However, reality illustrates in human society and the natural order, suffering—unnecessary, gratuitous suffering—exists in large quantities. Thus, this argument attempts to oppose an omnipotent, omnibenevolent God.

I will break a response to suffering or evil into two parts: moral suffering and natural suffering.

An objection to moral suffering argues that this kind of suffering exists because of free will. As humans are able to choose good with free will, then it must also be true that they are able to choose evil. A reality with free will without evil may be definitionally impossible.

On the other hand, an objection to natural suffering rests on human knowledge. This response asserts that natural suffering may be explained by God’s reasons that we do not understand. Just as a child undergoing surgery does not understand why they suffer, the universe may have suffering for reasons by which only God knows, and we do not understand.

I believe that the evidential problem of suffering is my largest obstacle in believing in God’s existence. Moral suffering may be explained by free will—however, unnecessary suffering such as children’s deaths or natural disaster seem to lack an effective explanation.

Logical arguments also exist on the definitions and properties of omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence.

The Omnipotence Paradox argues that there are logical inconsistencies when imagining an omnipotent being. A thought experiment poses this question: Could God create a rock that God could not lift? The line of reasoning follows that if the rock could be created, God would not be omnipotent for God would not be able to lift the rock. If God could not create the rock, then God would not be omnipotent for God could not create it.

The objection to this paradox argues that God cannot do logically impossible or definitionally contradictory acts. God cannot create square circles, for that is definitionally flawed.

I find the Omnipotence Paradox weak because it poses a contradiction based on the definition of omnipotence and can be easily answered by establishing a logical definition of omnipotence solving that contradiction. 

Another argument is Theological Fatalism, which attempts to challenge God’s omniscience with human free will. It poses the idea that if God were omniscient, God would hold knowledge of the future and therefore every action of every being. This seems to contradict the idea of free will, as then humans would be unable to choose actions that are contradictory to God’s knowledge of those actions.

An objection against God’s limitation rests on God’s separation from time. This objection argues that God is timeless, existing in past, present, and future. Therefore, his actions are not limited by temporal boundaries and flow. The objection against the human limitation rests on causation. The objection argues that God’s knowledge of actions does not cause the actions themselves: it is necessary that if God knows that you will do X, you will do X; however, that logic does not mean you must necessarily do X and are forced to do such by God’s knowledge. It is not causally determined that you must do X.

I believe Theological Fatalism is interesting because it questions free will. After all, choice and free will are values that are ingrained in the human self. Although I find God’s existence not incompatible with free will, it does pose questions on our significance and power before an omnipotent, omniscient God.

The Euthyphro Dilemma argues against God’s omnibenevolence and personal nature. Its two horns are thus: Is something good because God commanded it to be good, or because it was inherently good? It seems that if God commanded it, the morality of events seem arbitrary as they are only based on God’s will. If the events were inherently good, it seems God is not a supreme being, for there exists a separate rule of morality without God.

An objection to this dilemma is Divine Nature Theory. This argues that God is omnibenevolent and the manifestation of goodness. God’s commands are good because of an internal rule of morality based on God’s inherently good nature, rather than arbitrary commands or an external rule over God.

I find the Euthyphro Dilemma strong as it questions morality. Although God’s nature may explain goodness, I find it poses further questions about the origin of God’s nature, pushing back the dilemma from an action to God’s nature.

A final argument is the one of Divine Hiddenness, which argues against God’s personal nature. It argues that if God is a personal, omnibenevolent being, then it seems God would want a personal and truthful relationship with all of humanity. However, not only are there geographical, cultural, and temporal limitations in exposure to the idea of God, there exists reasonable non-believers who are open to the idea of God. 

An objection to this argument rests again on human knowledge. This objection asserts humanity may not be able to understand the mind of an omnibenevolent, personal being. There may be sufficient moral reasons for allowing the existence of these limitations and non-believers to exist.

I believe this argument is persuasive to me because I find many reasonable non-believers around me. The reason why God would permit reasonable non-believers to exist seems to be lacking. Regardless of the certainty of subjective religious experience and human bias, I find that the lack of clear, open evidence seems to oppose a true, personal God.

Ultimately, I am an Agnostic Atheist. Although I find it is more probable that God does not exist, I find that no arguments are conclusive. I believe that God’s existence may be impossible to prove or disprove, and that there will always exist discourse on the nature of God.

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